It is1995, the landscape of international diplomacy saw then Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal of the Labour Party extending a formal visit to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Fast forward to three years later, Milosevic escalated the situation by deploying additional troops to Kosovo, aiming to suppress Albanian separatist movements.
Reflecting on the quarter-century milestone since NATO initiated its airstrike campaign against Yugoslavia, the effort was aimed squarely at quelling the Kosovo crisis.
Norway’s former Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, played a pivotal role by authorizing the dispatch of Norwegian troops and fighter jets to bolster NATO’s offensive. This decisive action was targeted at curbing the egregious human rights violations perpetrated by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic against Kosovo’s Albanian population.
This move by Norway, contrasting with Jens Stoltenberg’s later action in Libya, was the result of comprehensive deliberations and unanimous consent within both the government and Storting, Norway’s parliament, with support even from the Socialist Left Party (SV).
Despite being celebrated as a proponent of peace, Bondevik’s tenure as Prime Minister during Norway’s involvement in NATO’s 1999 campaign against Yugoslavia, conducted without a UN mandate, raises questions. Reflecting on this, Bondevik maintains, “While the operation proceeded without a UN Security Council resolution, we were convinced that it did not violate international law. This belief was supported by existing UN resolutions and statements, as well as the Secretary-General’s report on Milosevic’s defiance, which collectively formed a legally sound basis for military action,” according to an interview with ABC News.
The NATO intervention stands out as the most significant military operation in Europe post-World War II, marking a historic first for NATO in engaging sovereign states directly.
The campaign saw the deployment of over 1100 aircraft, unleashing a barrage of bombs, including cluster munitions, against Yugoslavia, complemented by a naval assault with more than 200 cruise missiles.
Among the targets, NATO identified the Yugoslav “NRK” broadcasting facility in Belgrade as legitimate, tragically resulting in 16 fatalities.
Bondevik elucidates, “The impetus for our involvement was undoubtedly Milosevic’s egregious conduct towards Kosovo’s Albanian community. Despite exhaustive efforts, including diplomatic endeavors by Knut Vollebæk, then leading the OSCE, to persuade Milosevic to cease his repressive actions and withdraw Serbian forces, we were compelled towards military intervention.”
Bondevik reminisces about Milosevic’s defiance to peaceful resolutions, highlighting a pivotal conversation with Knut Vollebæk, a fellow advocate for peace, who, after numerous unsuccessful negotiations, concluded that a peaceful resolution was unattainable.
This close engagement with the conflict through Norway’s leadership in the OSCE presidency underscored the gravity of the situation, with Bondevik admitting, “Milosevic’s refusal to halt what we considered almost ethnic cleansing was a challenge that culminated in military intervention.”
Reflecting on the naming of the NATO action, Bondevik acknowledges a shift in perspective, from initially describing it as an armed intervention to recognizing it as warfare, in response to external perceptions and legal interpretations.
When asked about the legitimacy and outcomes of the war, Bondevik affirms, “Indeed, the intervention was justified as it led to the cessation of abuses in Kosovo, paving the way for Kosovo’s emergence as an independent and democratic entity.”